Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation
WZB Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. SP II 2005-04
24 Pages Posted: 10 May 2005
There are 2 versions of this paper
Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation
Date Written: January 2005
Abstract
Restrictions on work hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Our results also apply to nonwelfarist states which have income redistribution, but not in purely extortionary states.
Keywords: Optimal income taxation, labor unions, work hours
JEL Classification: H21, H23
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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