|
||||
|
||||
Organizational Structure and the Diversification Discount: Evidence from Commercial Banking
Peter G. Klein University of Missouri at Columbia - Contracting and Organizations Research Institute (CORI); Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration Marc R. Saidenberg affiliation not provided to SSRN CORI Working Paper No. 2008-01 (Earlier Version: CORI Working Paper No. 2005-06) Journal of Industrial Economics, Forthcoming Abstract: This paper provides evidence on organizational structure, geographic diversification, and performance at bank holding companies (BHCs). First, we show that a BHC's member banks benefit from access to the parent organization's internal capital market. Second, we ask if the benefits of internal capital markets are best realized within loosely structured, decentralized organizations or more consolidated, centralized firms. We find that BHCs with many subsidiaries are less profitable and have lower q ratios than similar BHCs with fewer subsidiaries. However, because we study multi-unit firms in a single industry, our results suggest that the valuation discount reported in the diversification literature in empirical corporate finance reflects not only industry diversification, but also organizational structure.
Keywords: Diversification, Organizational Structure, Bank Holding Companies, Internal Capital Markets, Diversification Discount JEL Classifications: L22, G21 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: May 11, 2005 ; Last revised: August 07, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was served by apollo5b in 0.375 seconds.