Citations (4)


Footnotes (233)



The Paradox of Predatory Pricing

Daniel A. Crane

University of Michigan Law School

Cornell Law Review, Vol. 91

This article contributes to the body of scholarship on the strategic misuse of antitrust law by examining the ways in which firms can use predatory pricing law to chill price competition by more efficient rivals or organize tacit collusion schemes. It also considers the tendency of the remedial structure of U.S. predatory pricing law to chill price competition even in the absence of strategic misuse. In addition to making theoretical claims about the chilling effects of predatory pricing law, the article reports the results of two surveys, one concerning the compensation structure of plaintiffs' attorneys in predatory pricing cases and one concerning predatory pricing counseling by in-house lawyers and the effects of predatory pricing law on firms' pricing decisions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 67

Keywords: antitrust, price fixing, predatory pricing

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: May 17, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Crane, Daniel A., The Paradox of Predatory Pricing. Cornell Law Review, Vol. 91. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=724166

Contact Information

Daniel A. Crane (Contact Author)
University of Michigan Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-615-2622 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 5,004
Downloads: 857
Download Rank: 17,139
Citations:  4
Footnotes:  233

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.375 seconds