Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=734524
 
 

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Pollution Incidence and Political Jurisdiction: Evidence from the TRI


Andrew B. Whitford


University of Georgia - Department of Public Administration and Policy

Eric Helland


Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance; RAND


Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 403-424, 2003

Abstract:     
Few issues are more contentious for local communities than industrial pollution. When local industries pollute, lawmakers and regulators must balance two primary concerns: economic prosperity and the environment. The role of political pressure is well-documented in environmental policy. What is less clear is the role jurisdictional or boundary considerations play in determining the implementation of environmental laws. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local regulators are more lenient in their treatment of polluters when the incidence of pollution falls partially on those outside the state. One explanation for such behavior is that regulators take actions to maximize political support. This paper tests this jurisdictional model using Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data from 1987 to 1996. We find that facilities' emissions into the air and water are systematically higher in counties that border other states. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that jurisdictional considerations are an important determinant of pollution incidence.

Keywords: environmental federalism, environmental policy, environmental enforcement, environmental regulation

JEL Classification: Q28, H11, H77, K2, K32

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: June 4, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Whitford, Andrew B. and Helland, Eric, Pollution Incidence and Political Jurisdiction: Evidence from the TRI. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 403-424, 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=734524

Contact Information

Andrew B. Whitford (Contact Author)
University of Georgia - Department of Public Administration and Policy ( email )
Athens, GA 30602
United States
706-542-2898 (Phone)
706-583-0610 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://andrewwhitford.com
Eric A. Helland
Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )
500 E. Ninth St.
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States
909-607-7275 (Phone)
909-621-8243 (Fax)
RAND ( email )
1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA
United States
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