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Chevron Step Zero


Cass R. Sunstein


Harvard Law School


Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, April 2006

Abstract:     
The most famous case in administrative law, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., has come to be seen as a counter-Marbury, or even a McCulloch v. Maryland, for the administrative state. But in the last period, new debates have broken out over Chevron Step Zero - the initial inquiry into whether Chevron applies at all. These debates are the contemporary location of a longstanding dispute between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer over whether Chevron is a revolutionary decision, establishing an across-the-board rule, or instead a mere synthesis of preexisting law, inviting a case-by-case inquiry into congressional instructions on the deference question. In the last decade, Justice Breyer's case-by-case view has enjoyed significant victories. Two trilogies of cases - one explicitly directed to the Step Zero question, another implicitly so directed - suggest that the Chevron framework may not apply (a) to agency decisions not preceded by formal procedures and (b) to agency decisions that involve large-scale questions about agency authority. Both of these trilogies threaten to unsettle the Chevron framework, and to do so in a way that produces unnecessary complexity for judicial review and damaging results for regulatory law. These problems can be reduced through two steps. First, courts should adopt a broader understanding of Chevron's scope. Second, courts should acknowledge that the argument for Chevron deference is strengthened, not weakened, when major questions of statutory structure are involved.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

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Date posted: June 11, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Sunstein, Cass R., Chevron Step Zero. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 2, April 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=739129

Contact Information

Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts Ave
Areeda Hall 225
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2291 (Phone)
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