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Decentralization in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes

Ali Cheema
Lahore University of Management Sciences

Asim Ijaz Khwaja
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government

Adnan Qadir
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management


April 2005

KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-034

Abstract:     
This paper provides a description of the recent decentralization reforms in Pakistan under General Musharraf. In the process, we hope to not only highlight major aspects of this reform, but also to analyze the evolution of this reform in historical context in order to better understand the potential causes behind the current decentralization. Analyzing the evolution of local government reforms in Pakistan is interesting because each of the reform experiments has been instituted at the behest of a non-representative centre using a 'top down' approach. The Pakistani experience shows that each of the reform experiments is a complementary change to a wider constitutional reengineering strategy devised to further centralization of political power in the hands of the non-representative centre. We argue here that the design of the local government reforms in these contexts becomes endogenous to the centralization objectives of the non-representative centre. It is hoped that analyzing the Pakistani experience will help shed light on the positive political economy question of why non-representative regimes have been willing proponents of decentralization to the local level.

Keywords: International Development, Law and Legal Institutions, Leadership/Conflict Management, Political Science, Public Management

Working Paper Series

Date posted: June 08, 2005 ; Last revised: June 08, 2005

Suggested Citation

Cheema, Ali, Khwaja, Asim Ijaz and Qadir, Adnan, Decentralization in Pakistan: Context, Content and Causes (April 2005). KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-034. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=739712


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Contact Information

Asim Ijaz Khwaja (Contact Author)
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-7790 (Phone)
617-496-5960 (Fax)
Ali Cheema
Lahore University of Management Sciences ( email )
Lahore Pakistan
Adnan Qadir
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
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