  |
|
|
||||
|
||||
Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry
Keith C. Brown University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance W. Van Harlow Fidelity Investments Laura T. Starks University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance J. OF FINANCE, Vol. 51 No. 1, March 1996 Abstract: We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as "losers" will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be "winners." An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth-oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid-year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid-year winners. Further, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.
JEL Classifications: G10 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: June 28, 1998 ; Last revised: June 28, 1998Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||
© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was served by apollo 4 in 0.109 seconds.
Facebook
Twitter
Digg
Del.icio.us
CiteULike
