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http://ssrn.com/abstract=746406
 
 

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The Social Insurance Crisis and the Problem of Collective Saving: A Commentary on Shaviro's 'Reckless Disregard'


David I. Walker


Boston University School of Law


Boston College Law Review, Vol. 45, pp. 1347-1361, 2004

Abstract:     
Long-range Social Security and Medicare spending projections vastly exceed projected program revenues. If left unchecked, the resulting fiscal imbalance (estimated at $40 to $70 trillion in present value terms) would fall primarily on future generations. To avoid generational inequity, and perhaps fiscal meltdown, Professor Daniel N. Shaviro and others propose immediate fiscal austerity. This reply Commentary argues that near-term austerity is unlikely to play a significant role in overcoming the fiscal imbalance, which can be thought of as a balloon payment due mid-twenty-first century. Significant near-term fiscal austerity would eliminate the public debt and replace it with a public surplus. Political economy theory and U.S. public debt history suggest that this path is infeasible. This Commentary also stresses the importance of disaggregating the "Social Security and Medicare" problems. Contrary to popular belief, Medicare is by far the larger problem, and the Medicare imbalance is driven by projected spending increases outpacing overall economic growth indefinitely. These observations suggest that a focus on Medicare cost control, rather than revenue enhancement, is called for.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: Social Security, Medicare, fiscal gap, tax cuts, size of government

JEL Classification: H20, H55, H60, H62

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Date posted: June 20, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Walker, David I., The Social Insurance Crisis and the Problem of Collective Saving: A Commentary on Shaviro's 'Reckless Disregard'. Boston College Law Review, Vol. 45, pp. 1347-1361, 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=746406

Contact Information

David I. Walker (Contact Author)
Boston University School of Law ( email )
765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
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