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The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence

Jonathan M. Karpoff
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

John R. Lott Jr.
University of Maryland Foundation, University of Maryland

Eric W. Wehrly
University of Washington - Department of Finance and Business Economics



Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper examines the sizes of the fines, damage awards, remediation costs, and market value losses imposed on companies that violate environmental regulations. Firms violating environmental laws suffer statistically significant losses in the market value of firm equity. The losses, however, are of similar magnitudes to the legal penalties imposed; and in the cross section, the market value loss is related to the size of the legal penalty. Thus, environmental violations are disciplined largely through legal and regulatory penalties, not through reputational penalties.

Keywords: Environmental violations, corporate misconduct, legal penalties, reputation costs

JEL Classifications: K32, K42, Q58

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: August 16, 2005 ; Last revised: August 16, 2005

Suggested Citation

Karpoff, Jonathan M., Lott, John R. and Wehrly, Eric W., The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=747824


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Contact Information

Jonathan M. Karpoff (Contact Author)
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
206-685-4954 (Phone)
206-221-6856 (Fax)
John R. Lott Jr.
University of Maryland Foundation, University of Maryland ( email )
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
United States
Eric W. Wehrly
University of Washington - Department of Finance and Business Economics ( email )
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195
United States
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