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Democratization and Clientelism: Why Are Young Democracies Badly Governed?

Philip Keefer
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)


May 2005

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3594

Abstract:     
This paper identifies and explains systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality and lower secondary school enrollment; and spend more on public investment and government workers. One explanation for this is that politicians in young democracies are less credible. Keefer and Vlaicu (2004) argue that the inability of political competitors to make credible promises to citizens leads them to underprovide public goods, overprovide transfers to narrow groups of voters, and engage in excessive rent-seeking. A variety of tests suggest that this is the only theory that explains the performance of young democracies. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: June 24, 2005 ; Last revised: June 24, 2005

Suggested Citation

Keefer, Philip, Democratization and Clientelism: Why Are Young Democracies Badly Governed? (May 2005). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3594. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=748364


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Contact Information

Philip Keefer (Contact Author)
World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-2479 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/pkeefer
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