Group Cooperation Under Alternative Punishment Institutions: An Experiment
Purdue University - Department of Economics
University of Siena - Department of Economics
July 2, 2005
In an experiment we study different peer punishment institutions to shed light on how cooperative norms can emerge in groups. The results suggest that there is a strong emotional component that drives agents to punish and that alters their ability to behave strategically. Moreover, we identify an institution that particularly encourages pro-social behavior; when a coalition of at least two subjects in the group must agree before somebody is punished, group performance dramatically increases.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 31
Keywords: Public goods, peer punishment, social norms, team production, experiments
JEL Classification: C91, C92, H41, D23working papers series
Date posted: July 15, 2005
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.343 seconds