Scrutinizing Commercial Speech
Troy L. Booher
Zimmerman Jones Booher LLC; S.J. Quinney College of Law
George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal (CRLJ), Vol. 15, No. 1
Commercial speech continues to be formally distinguished from noncommercial speech under the First Amendment. However, a careful analysis of the development of commercial speech doctrine reveals that formally abandoning the distinction is merely the natural extension of, if not entailed by, commercial speech jurisprudence already in place. I argue that when we carefully examine what appear to be disagreements over levels of scrutiny, we can see that they are really disagreements over what constitutes a compelling state interest in the commercial speech context.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11
Keywords: Commercial speech, first amendment, free speech, scrutiny
Date posted: July 23, 2005
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 1.719 seconds