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Choice of Routes in Congested Traffic Networks: Experimental Tests of the Braess Paradox

Amnon Rapoport
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

Tamar Kugler
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

Subhasish Dugar
University of Calgary

Eyran J. Gisches
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management


July 6, 2005


Abstract:     
The Braess paradox (Braess, 1968) consists of showing that, in equilibrium, adding a new link that connects two routes running between a common origin and common destination may raise the travel cost for each network user. We report the results of two experiments designed to study whether the paradox is behaviorally realized in two simulated traffic networks that differ from each other in their topology. Implementing a within-subjects design, both experiments include finite populations of paid participants in a computer-controlled setup who independently and repeatedly choose travel routes in one of two types of traffic networks, one without the added links and the other with the added links, to minimize their travel costs. Our results reject the hypothesis that the paradox is of marginal value and its force, if at all evident, diminishes with experience. Rather, they strongly support the alternative hypothesis that with experience in traversing the traffic network players converge to choosing the Pareto deficient equilibrium routes despite sustaining a sharp decline in their earnings.

Keywords: Braess Paradox, congested traffic networks, choice of routes, experimental study

Working Paper Series

Date posted: July 19, 2005 ; Last revised: July 19, 2005

Suggested Citation

Rapoport, Amnon, Kugler, Tamar, Dugar, Subhasish and Gisches, Eyran J., Choice of Routes in Congested Traffic Networks: Experimental Tests of the Braess Paradox (July 6, 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=758059


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Contact Information

Amnon Rapoport (Contact Author)
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )
McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-9325 (Phone)
520-621-4171 (Fax)
Subhasish Dugar
University of Calgary ( email )
2500 University Drive, NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 Canada
Eyran J. Gisches
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )
McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
Tamar Kugler
University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )
McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
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