Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=758508
 
 

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Inside Debt


Alex Edmans


London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting; University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Qi Liu


Peking University - Department of Finance

June 29, 2011

Review of Finance, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 75-102, January 2011
EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
Existing theories advocate the exclusive use of equity-like instruments in executive compensation. However, recent empirical studies document the prevalence of debt-like instruments such as pensions. This paper justifies the use of debt as efficient compensation. Inside debt is a superior solution to the agency costs of debt than the solvency-contingent bonuses and salaries proposed by prior literature, since its payoff depends not only on the incidence of bankruptcy but also firm value in bankruptcy. Contrary to intuition, granting the manager equal proportions of debt and equity is typically inefficient. In most cases, an equity bias is desired to induce effort. However, if effort is productive in increasing liquidation value, or if bankruptcy is likely, a debt bias can improve effort as well as deter risk shifting. The model generates a number of empirical predictions consistent with recent evidence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: Agency costs of debt, asset substitution, risk shifting, executive compensation, pensions

JEL Classification: G32, G34, J33

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: July 21, 2005 ; Last revised: December 7, 2011

Suggested Citation

Edmans, Alex and Liu, Qi, Inside Debt (June 29, 2011). Review of Finance, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 75-102, January 2011; EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=758508

Contact Information

Alex Edmans (Contact Author)
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3733 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6374
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Qi Liu
Peking University - Department of Finance ( email )
Beijing
China
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