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A Call for Change: Improving Judicial Selection Methods

Jason J. Czarnezki

Pace University - School of Law

Marquette Law Review, Vol. 89, 2005
Marquette University Legal Studies Paper No. 06-14

Empirical data show that, despite the significant electoral success of state court judges, elections still impact judicial decision-making, and elected judges are less consistent in their voting patterns than appointed judges. In addition, if interest in state judicial elections continues to wane and these contests are not robust, states no longer even benefits from the participatory advantages of an elective system. Using the State of Wisconsin as an example, this Article suggests that Wisconsin and other state legislatures, with the support of bar associations and academics, should revisit the historical underpinnings of judicial elections, and consider both whether electing judges conforms with the historical goals of having an elected judiciary and whether the available empirical data support the belief that elected judges can be systematically consistent and independent in the decision-making process.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: Courts, judges, judicial selection, election, voting

JEL Classification: K4

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Date posted: July 27, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Czarnezki, Jason J., A Call for Change: Improving Judicial Selection Methods. Marquette Law Review, Vol. 89, 2005; Marquette University Legal Studies Paper No. 06-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=759947

Contact Information

Jason J. Czarnezki (Contact Author)
Pace University - School of Law ( email )
78 North Broadway
White Plains, NY 10603
United States
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