Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=760324
 
 

References (70)



 
 

Citations (15)



 


 



Shareholder Rights, Corporate Governance and Accounting Restatement


William R. Baber


Georgetown University - Department of Accounting and Business Law

Sok-Hyon Kang


George Washington University - School of Business

Lihong Liang


Syracuse University

Zinan Zhu


National University of Singapore

February 1, 2009


Abstract:     
This study investigates associations between accounting restatements and statutory and corporate charter provisions that limit shareholder participation in the governance process. The analysis indicates that characteristics of strong external governance (fewer restrictions on shareholder participation) are associated with relatively low probabilities of accounting restatement. These results are robust when we consider both alternative external governance measures and when we control for internal governance characteristics frequently advanced by governance experts and imposed by regulators. If accounting restatements indicate management behavior that contradicts shareholder interests, and if the policy objective is to discourage such behavior, then the evidence supports policy that encourages shareholder participation in the governance process.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Corporate governance, Strong board, External Governance, Accounting Restatement

JEL Classification: G34, M41, M43

working papers series


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Date posted: July 26, 2005 ; Last revised: February 22, 2012

Suggested Citation

Baber, William R. and Kang, Sok-Hyon and Liang, Lihong and Zhu, Zinan, Shareholder Rights, Corporate Governance and Accounting Restatement (February 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=760324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.760324

Contact Information

William R. Baber (Contact Author)
Georgetown University - Department of Accounting and Business Law ( email )
McDonough School of Business
Washington, DC 20057
United States

Sok-Hyon Kang
George Washington University - School of Business ( email )
405 Government Hall
GWU
Washington, DC 20052
United States
(202) 994-6058 (Phone)
(202) 994-5164 (Fax)
Lihong Liang
Syracuse University ( email )
Whitman School of Management
Syracuse, NY 13244
United States
Zinan Zhu
National University of Singapore ( email )
15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 119245
Singapore
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