The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment
Jaap H. Abbring
Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tinbergen Institute; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Gerard J. van den Berg
VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Tinbergen Institute
Jan C. van Ours
Tilburg University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Department of Economics
Economic Journal, Vol. 115, No. 505, pp. 602-630, July 2005
Sanctions or punitive benefits reductions are increasingly used as a tool to enforce compliance of unemployment insurance claimants with search requirements. This article analyses sanctions using a unique administrative data set of individuals who started collecting unemployment insurance in the Netherlands in 1992. After correction for selectivity in the imposition of sanctions, we find that sanctions substantially raise individual re-employment rates.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29
Date posted: July 22, 2005
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 2.516 seconds