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http://ssrn.com/abstract=764430
 
 

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Why do Politicians Delegate?


Alberto F. Alesina


Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Guido Tabellini


University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo); Bocconi University - Department of Economics

July 2005

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2079

Abstract:     
Opportunistic politicians maximize the probability of reelection and rents from office holding. Can it be optimal from their point of view to delegate policy choices to independent bureaucracies? The answer is yes: politicians will delegate some policy tasks, though in general not those that would be socially optimal to delegate. In particular, politicians tend not to delegate coalition forming redistributive policies and policies that create large rents or effective campaign contributions. Instead they prefer to delegate risky policies to shift risk (and blame) on bureaucracies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

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Date posted: July 28, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto F. and Tabellini, Guido, Why do Politicians Delegate? (July 2005). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2079. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=764430 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.764430

Contact Information

Alberto F. Alesina (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-8388 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Guido Tabellini
University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy
+39 02 5836 3305 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 3302 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy
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