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Chapter 11Lucian A. BebchukHarvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 3, pp. 219-224, 1998 Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 227 Abstract: This essay surveys the literature on Chapter 11. I start by discussing the objectives by which the performance of corporate reorganization rules is to be judged and then consider the fundamental problem of valuation that arises in corporate reorganization. I next turn to examine the performance of the prevailing bargaining-based approach to reorganization, both in terms of its effect on total reorganization value and in terms of its effect on the division of this value. Finally, I examine the two alternative approaches that have been put forward to the approach of existing rules - that of auctioning the reorganized company's asset (put forward by Baird (1986) and Jensen (1991) and that of using options to reorganize the company's ownership (put forward by Bebchuk (1988)).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 20 JEL Classification: G33 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: April 17, 1998 ; Last revised: April 29, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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