Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=770144
 
 

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The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law


Damien Geradin


George Mason University School of Law; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Covington & Burling LLP

Nicolas Petit


University of Liege - School of Law

Mike Walker


Charles River Associates, Incorporated

Paul Hofer


NERA Economic Consulting

Frédéric Louis


Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

July 2005


Abstract:     
The first prong of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abuses of a dominant position, requires, prior to the identification of abusive behaviour, evidence that the firm under scrutiny enjoys a dominant position. Surprisingly, this issue seems to be sometimes overlooked. Enforcers, practitioners and scholars have recently paid greater attention to the concept of abuse than to the question of dominance when discussing Article 82 EC. This should not, however, be interpreted as a sign that the law of dominance is clear. Quite to the contrary, the concept of dominance raises a wide array of questions which are discussed in the sections that follow.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: abuse of dominance, antitrust, EC competition law, market definition, barriers to entry, vertical integration, network effects, essential facilities, collective dominance, buyer power, economies of scale, economies of scope

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L13, L22, L40, L50

working papers series


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Date posted: August 5, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien and Petit, Nicolas and Walker, Mike and Hofer, Paul and Louis, Frédéric, The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law (July 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=770144 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.770144

Contact Information

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

George Mason Law School Logo

Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/
Covington & Burling LLP ( email )
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-2401
United States
Nicolas Petit
University of Liege - School of Law ( email )
B-4000 Liege
Belgium
Mike Walker
Charles River Associates, Incorporated ( email )
1201 F. St. NW
Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20004
United States
Paul Hofer
NERA Economic Consulting ( email )
One Main Street, 5th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
Frédéric Louis
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP ( email )
60 State Street
Boston, MA 02109
United States
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