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'Price Barriers' and the Dynamics of Asset Prices in Equilibrium


Pierluigi Balduzzi


Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Silverio Foresi


Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. - Quantitative Strategy Group

David J. Hait


OptionMetrics

Undated


Abstract:     
In a variety of realistic scenarios, some investors trade infrequently rather than continuously, basing their buy or sell decisions on current price levels. A "price barrier" is a price level at which a large number of investors either buy or sell securities. We analyze the dynamics of asset prices in an economy with infrequent traders and price barriers. Our analysis predicts that when price barriers exist, both asset prices and price volatility can jump at the time the price barrier is reached, even if the trade is rationally anticipated. Moreover, the direction of the price jump may very well be the opposite of what one would expect. A price-triggered purchase may generate a downward jump in stock prices and, vice versa, a price-triggered sale may induce stock prices to jump above the price barrier. This is because trades affect prices before they are implemented: the anticipation of a stock purchase inflates stock prices, while the anticipation of a stock sale depresses stock prices. In the case of repeated trades, before-trade prices anticipate not only the next trade, but also the following ones. This may lead to the counterintuitive result that stock prices are inflated, rather than depressed, in the proximity of a stock sale.

JEL Classification: G12

working papers series


Date posted: June 6, 1995  

Suggested Citation

Balduzzi, Pierluigi, Foresi, Silverio and Hait, David J., 'Price Barriers' and the Dynamics of Asset Prices in Equilibrium (Undated). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=7708

Contact Information

Pierluigi Balduzzi (Contact Author)
Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )
Department of Finance
140 Commonwealth Avenue - Fulton Hall 438
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
617-552-3976 (Phone)
617-552-0431 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/csom/faculty/
Silverio Foresi
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. - Quantitative Strategy Group ( email )
32 Old Slip, 24th Floor
New York, NY 10005
United States
(212) 357-3508 (Phone)
David J. Hait
OptionMetrics
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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