Obstacles to Bargaining Between Local Governments: The Case of West Haven and Orange, Connecticut
Brooklyn Law School
Urban Lawyer, Vol. 37, 2005
Limited empirical work on interlocal bargaining has uncovered relatively efficient bargaining between local governments for services like police, fire, street maintenance, and education. This paper explores the relationship between two Connecticut towns in the metropolitan New Haven area, Orange and West Haven, and suggests that bargaining between local governments can be more difficult and complicated than heretofore recognized when towns try to achieve economies of scale in the production of local public goods and to account for cost and benefit spillovers between local jurisdictions. It offers a number of legal changes that may help localities bargain more efficiently.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53
Keywords: Local government law, property law, contracts, industrial organization, organizational law, public finance
JEL Classification: K00, R59, L14Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 11, 2005
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.484 seconds