From Orders to Markets
Jonathan R. Macey
Yale Law School
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
Regulation, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 62-70, Summer 2005
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 321
Among the clearest rules in U.S. securities law is the duty that brokers have to "seek the best execution that is reasonably available for its customers' orders." The problem with the current orientation of the policy discussion on best execution is that it has focused on the narrow, yet unanswerable, question of which venue provides traders with "best execution." For example, it makes no sense to employ the same, or even a similar, legal definition of the duty of best execution for large institutional traders and for small retail traders. In this article, we examine the alternative institutions most likely to generate optimal rules regarding best execution.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11
Keywords: Brokers, best execution, traders, securities law
JEL Classification: D4, D8, G3, K2, K22, M1Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: August 10, 2005
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