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Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis

R. Preston McAfee
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Hugo M. Mialon
Emory University - Department of Economics

Sue H. Mialon
Emory University



Journal of Public Economics, Forthcoming
Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-20
Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 06-4

Abstract:     
We compare private and public enforcement of the antitrust laws in a simple strategic model of antitrust violation and lawsuit. The model highlights the tradeoff that private firms are initially more likely than the government to be informed about antitrust violations, but are also more likely to use the antitrust laws strategically, to the disadvantage of consumers. Assuming coupled private damages, if the court is sufficiently accurate, adding private enforcement to public enforcement always increases social welfare, while if the court is less accurate, it increases welfare only if the government is sufficiently inefficient in litigation. Pure private enforcement is never strictly optimal. Public enforcement can achieve the social optimum with a fee for public lawsuit that induces efficient information revelation. Private enforcement can also achieve the social optimum with private damages that are efficiently multiplied and decoupled.

Keywords: Private and Public Enforcement, Antitrust Laws, Strategic Abuse, Free-riding, Information Revelation, Social Welfare

JEL Classifications: L44, H11, H41, K21, D82

Working Paper Series

Date posted: August 11, 2005 ; Last revised: May 11, 2008

Suggested Citation

McAfee, R. Preston, Mialon, Hugo M. and Mialon, Sue H., Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis. Journal of Public Economics, Forthcoming; Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-20; Emory Public Law Research Paper No. 06-4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=775245


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Contact Information

Sue H. Mialon (Contact Author)
Emory University ( email )
Department of Economics
1602 Fishburne Dr.
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-712-8169 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.suemialon.net
Randolph Preston McAfee
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )
1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
Hugo M. Mialon
Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )
1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
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