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Law and FinanceRafael La PortaDartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Florencio Lopez de SilanesEDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute Andrei ShleiferHarvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Robert W. VishnyUniversity of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) July 1996 NBER Working Paper No. w5661 Abstract: This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 80 working papers seriesDate posted: September 27, 1996Suggested CitationContact Information
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