Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=784805
 
 

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Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?


R. Preston McAfee


Yahoo! Research Labs

Hugo M. Mialon


Emory University - Department of Economics

Sue H. Mialon


Emory University

August 16, 2005

Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-18

Abstract:     
The antitrust laws are intended to permit procompetitive actions by firms and deter anticompetitive actions. We consider firms' incentives to use the antitrust lawsuits for strategic purposes, in particular to prevent procompetitive efficiency-improvement by rival firms. Our main result is that, ceteris paribus, smaller firms in more fragmented industries are more likely to use the antitrust laws strategically than larger firms in concentrated industries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

JEL Classification: L44, K21, H11

working papers series


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Date posted: August 19, 2005  

Suggested Citation

McAfee, R. Preston and Mialon, Hugo M. and Mialon, Sue H., Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive? (August 16, 2005). Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=784805 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.784805

Contact Information

Randolph Preston McAfee
Yahoo! Research Labs ( email )
Pasadena, CA 91103
United States
Hugo M. Mialon (Contact Author)
Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )
1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
Sue H. Mialon
Emory University ( email )
Department of Economics
1602 Fishburne Dr.
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States
404-712-8169 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.suemialon.net
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