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Systemic Risk and Regulation


Franklin Allen


University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Douglas M. Gale


New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

2005

Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper No. 95-24

Abstract:     
Historically, much of the banking regulation that was put in place was designed to reduce systemic risk. In many countries capital regulation in the form of the Basel agreements is currently one of the most important measures to reduce systemic risk. In recent years there has been considerable growth in the transfer of credit risk across and between sectors of the financial system. In particular there is evidence that risk has been transfered from the banking sector to the insurance sector. One argument is that this is desirable and simply reflects diversification opportunities. Another is that it represents regulatory arbitrage and the concentration of risk that may result from this could increase systemic risk. This paper shows that both scenarios are possible depending on whether markets and contracts are complete or incomplete.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

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Date posted: August 30, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Allen, Franklin and Gale, Douglas M., Systemic Risk and Regulation (2005). Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper No. 95-24. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=787797 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.787797

Contact Information

Franklin Allen (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-3629 (Phone)
215-573-2207 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~allenf/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Douglas M. Gale
New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )
269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
(212) 998-8944 (Phone)
(212) 995-3932 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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