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Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic


Zsolt Darvas


Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration

Andrew K. Rose


University of California - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gyorgy Szapary


National Bank of Hungary

August 2005

NBER Working Paper No. w11580

Abstract:     
Using a panel of 21 OECD countries and 40 years of annual data, we find that countries with similar government budget positions tend to have business cycles that fluctuate more closely. That is, fiscal convergence (in the form of persistently similar ratios of government surplus/deficit to GDP) is systematically associated with more synchronized business cycles. We also find evidence that reduced fiscal deficits increase business cycle synchronization. The Maastricht %u201Cconvergence criteria,%u201D used to determine eligibility for EMU, encouraged fiscal convergence and deficit reduction. They may thus have indirectly moved Europe closer to an optimum currency area, by reducing countries%u2019 abilities to create idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. Our empirical results are economically and statistically significant, and robust.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

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Date posted: October 17, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Darvas, Zsolt, Rose, Andrew K. and Szapary, Gyorgy, Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle Synchronization: Irresponsibility is Idiosyncratic (August 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11580. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=788445

Contact Information

Zsolt Darvas
Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration (Corvinus University) ( email )
Budapest H-1093
Hungary
HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-corvinus.hu/darvas
Andrew K. Rose (Contact Author)
University of California - Haas School of Business ( email )
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-6609 (Phone)
510-642-4700 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Gyorgy Szapary
National Bank of Hungary ( email )
1054 Szabadsag ter 8-9
H-1850 Budapest V.
Hungary
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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