The Economics of Shame: Why more Shaming may Deter Less
Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law
August 24, 2005
This paper investigates the effectiveness of shaming penalties. It establishes that there may be an inverse relation between the rate of shaming penalties and their deterrent effects - the more people are shamed the less deterring shaming penalties become. This conclusion is based on a search model in which the costs of searching for law-abiding partners increase with the rate of shaming, and may lead to lower expected sanction for offenders. The inverse relation between the rate of shaming penalties and their effectiveness is later used to show that increasing the probability of detection, increasing the magnitude of shaming penalties or reducing the number of wrongful acquittals does not necessarily increase the deterrent effects of shaming penalties (and may, in fact, decrease these effects).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Keywords: Shaming, stigma, criminal law, social norms, deterrence, search
JEL Classification: D83, K14, K42working papers series
Date posted: August 26, 2005
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.438 seconds