Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=789767
 
 

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Accuracy Enhancement, Agency Costs, and Disclosure Regulation


Michael D. Guttentag


Loyola Law School Los Angeles


Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007
Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2008-38

Abstract:     
This article develops a model in which firms may commit to disclose varying amounts of two types of information, accuracy information and agency information, and in which a regulator may also mandate disclosures. The resulting analysis provides a way to better understand the complex relationship between disclosure regulation and social welfare, including issues such as: how disclosure regulation can generate social welfare gains (contra Dye, 1990; Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000), why imposing disclosure requirements on only certain firms and certain information may be efficient, and why stricter mandatory disclosure requirements may be an efficient regulatory response to more robust public securities markets (contra La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: agency costs, disclosure regulation, interfirm externalities

JEL Classification: D62, G38, K22, M40

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Date posted: August 30, 2005 ; Last revised: July 24, 2010

Suggested Citation

Guttentag, Michael D., Accuracy Enhancement, Agency Costs, and Disclosure Regulation. Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007; Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2008-38. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=789767

Contact Information

Michael D. Guttentag (Contact Author)
Loyola Law School Los Angeles ( email )
919 Albany Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-1211
United States
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