SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

References (41)

Beta

 
 

Citations (43)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments

Michael Greenstone
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); American Bar Foundation

Annette Vissing-Jorgensen
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Paul Oyer
Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)



Quarterly Journal of Economics, Forthcoming
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 296
MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-33
AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings

Abstract:     
The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments extended the mandatory disclosure requirements that had applied to listed firms since 1934 to large firms traded Over-the-Counter (OTC). We find several pieces of evidence indicating that investors valued these disclosure requirements, two of which are particularly striking. First, a firm-level event study reveals that the OTC firms most affected by the 1964 Amendments had abnormal excess returns of about 3.5 percent in the weeks immediately surrounding the announcement that they had begun to comply with the new requirements. Second, we estimate that the most affected OTC firms had abnormal excess returns ranging between 11.5 and 22.1 percent in the period between when the legislation was initially proposed and when it went into force. These returns are adjusted for the standard four factors and are relative to NYSE/AMEX firms, matched on size and book-to-market equity, that were unaffected by the legislation. While we cannot determine how much of shareholders' gains were a transfer from insiders of these same companies, our results suggest that mandatory disclosure causes managers to focus more narrowly on maximizing shareholder value.

Keywords: disclosure, SEC, securities market regulation

JEL Classifications: G12, G28, G38, K22, L51, M41, M45, N22

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: August 26, 2005 ; Last revised: November 04, 2005

Suggested Citation

Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette, Greenstone, Michael and Oyer, Paul, Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Forthcoming; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 296; MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-33; AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=789865 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.597142


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Paul Oyer (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-736-1047 (Phone)
650-725-0468 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Michael Greenstone
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
American Bar Foundation
750 N. Lake Shore Drive
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
Department of Finance
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-2001
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/vissing/htm/research1.htm
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,370
Downloads: 377
Download Rank: 6,603
References: 41
Citations: 43

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.140 seconds.