Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business - Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Richard A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5186
Two recent failures of the United States intelligence system have led to the creation of high-level investigative commissions. The failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the creation of the 9/11 Commission, and the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass destruction prompted the creation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. We use insights from organizational economics to analyze the principal organizational issues raised by these commissions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: Organizational economics, intelligence reform, war on terrorism
JEL Classification: D2, D8, H1, K0, L22, L32working papers series
Date posted: September 1, 2005
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