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http://ssrn.com/abstract=797125
 
 

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How Facts Make Law


Mark Greenberg


UCLA School of Law and Department of Philosophy


Legal Theory, Vol. 10, pp. 157-198, 2004
UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 05-22

Abstract:     
I offer a new argument against the legal positivist view that non-normative social facts can themselves determine the content of the law. I argue that the nature of the determination relation in law is rational determination: the contribution of law-determining practices to the content of the law must be based on reasons. That is why it must be possible in principle to explain what makes the law have the content that it does. It follows, I argue, that non-normative facts about statutes, judicial decisions, and other practices cannot themselves determine the content of the law. A full account must appeal to considerations independent of the practices that determine the relevance of the practices to the content of the law. Normative facts are the best candidates.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: philosophy, legal positivism, law and morality, law and reasons, normativity

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Date posted: September 8, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Greenberg, Mark, How Facts Make Law. Legal Theory, Vol. 10, pp. 157-198, 2004; UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 05-22. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=797125

Contact Information

Mark Greenberg (Contact Author)
UCLA School of Law and Department of Philosophy ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
(310) 206-1337 (Phone)
(310) 825-6023 (Fax)
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