Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=799274
 
 

Citations (6)



 
 

Footnotes (76)



 


 



Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements


Florencia Marotta-Wurgler


New York University School of Law

August 22, 2005

NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-11

Abstract:     
Most commercial transactions are governed by standard form contracts. But despite the ubiquity of standard forms, there has been little empirical study of their content and determinants. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of 647 software license agreements, paying special attention to the role of competitive forces in shaping standard terms. Friedrich Kessler argued that companies in concentrated industries, or companies with dominant market share, take advantage of their position by imposing one-sided standard terms that limit their obligations to consumers; other scholars have argued that market structure is irrelevant to the standard terms offered to buyers. The results support the latter view. While software products' prices are highly sensitive to competitive conditions such as concentration and market share, license agreement terms are not. By demonstrating that sellers with market power do not offer unusually harsh terms, the results suggest that an important aspect of the standard analysis of procedural unconscionability is misguided. More broadly, the analysis provides a wealth of descriptive detail about an important class of modern standard form contracts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 7, 2005 ; Last revised: May 15, 2014

Suggested Citation

Marotta-Wurgler, Florencia, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements (August 22, 2005). NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=799274 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.799274

Contact Information

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
HOME PAGE: http://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=27875
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,244
Downloads: 661
Download Rank: 20,475
Citations:  6
Footnotes:  76
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.328 seconds