SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

Are 'Pay Now, Terms Later' Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler
New York University - School of Law


August 22, 2005

NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-10

Abstract:     
The rise of commerce over the Internet and telephone has led to widespread use of "pay now, terms later" or "rolling" standard form contracts, in which buyers are not able to read the standard terms until after they have purchased the product. While some scholars and judges argue that rolling contracts do not merit special attention, others, including consumer advocates, are concerned that sellers take advantage of delayed disclosure by hiding especially unfavorable terms. Using a large sample of software license agreements, this paper shows that software publishers who use rolling contracts for their online sales do not, in fact, present more one-sided terms than those who make their licenses available prior to purchase. If anything, it is the contracts that require buyers to explicitly agree to terms before completing an online purchase that have the strongest pro-seller bias. Thus, to the extent there are inefficiencies associated with standard form contracts, they are not made worse by delayed disclosure.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 07, 2005 ; Last revised: March 19, 2009

Suggested Citation

Marotta-Wurgler, Florencia, Are 'Pay Now, Terms Later' Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements (August 22, 2005). NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-10. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=799282


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler (Contact Author)
New York University - School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
HOME PAGE: http://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?personID=27875
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,927
Downloads: 339
Download Rank: 23,647

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.125 seconds.