Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=799328
 
 

Citations (3)



 
 

Footnotes (114)



 


 



Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability, and the Governance of Relational Contracts


Donald J. Smythe


California Western School of Law


Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2

Abstract:     
This article uses a behavioral economics approach to analyze the effects of the doctrine of impracticability on "relational" contracts - long-term contractual agreements that are typically adapted to changed circumstances and unforeseen contingencies as they arise. In contrast to conventional law and economics studies, the article concludes that the impracticability doctrine has the potential to improve the efficiency and productivity of a wide range of long-term contractual agreements, and offers normative guidelines as to how the doctrine should be applied. The article also examines and rejects various philosophical objections to the impracticability doctrine, such as the arguments that it interferes with principles of economic liberty and voluntary exchange, that it interferes with the internal ethics of relational agreements, and that it clashes with principles of moral desert.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 89

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: September 16, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Smythe, Donald J., Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability, and the Governance of Relational Contracts. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=799328

Contact Information

Donald J. Smythe (Contact Author)
California Western School of Law ( email )
225 Cedar Street
San Diego, CA 92101
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,425
Downloads: 209
Download Rank: 87,348
Citations:  3
Footnotes:  114

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.266 seconds