|
||||
|
||||
Antitrust Law and Competition for Distribution
Joshua D. Wright George Mason University School of Law Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 23, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 169-208 George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-28 Abstract: An unsettled area of antitrust law is the regulation of the competitive process for product distribution and promotion. Competition for distribution involves vertical contracting with respect to product placement, promotional activity, or the decision to carry a particular product. This process includes controversial practices recently subject to intense scrutiny such as slotting allowances, loyalty discounts, bundled rebates, category management and exclusive dealing. Antitrust law has designed rules for each of these practices independently, ignoring the economic relationships between these business practices. This paper examines those relationships by focusing on the economics of competition for distribution. Viewing these practices as part of the competitive process for distribution exposes an antitrust policy that systematically mishandles the regulation of these contracts. The article concludes by arguing in favor of per se legality for distribution contracts foreclosing less than 40% of the market and agreements less than one year in duration.
Keywords: Antitrust, monopolization, category management, competition for distribution, exclusive dealing, shelf space, slotting allowances JEL Classifications: K21, L41, L42 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: September 08, 2005 ; Last revised: August 18, 2006Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||
© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.312 seconds.