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Do Accountability and Voucher Threats Improve Low-Performing Schools?


David N. Figlio


Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Cecilia E. Rouse


Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

September 2005

NBER Working Paper No. w11597

Abstract:     
In this paper we study the effects of the threat of school vouchers and school stigma in Florida on the performance of "low-performing" schools using student-level data from a subset of districts. Estimates of the change in school-level high-stakes test scores from the first year of the reform are consistent with the early results used by the state of Florida to claim large-scale improvements associated with the threat of voucher assignment. However, we also find that much of this estimated effect may be due to other factors. While we estimate a small relative improvement in reading scores on the high-stakes test for voucher-threatened/stigmatized schools, we estimate a much smaller relative improvement on a lower-stakes, nationally norm-referenced, test. Further, the relative gains in reading scores are explained largely by changing student characteristics. We find more evidence for a positive differential effect on math test scores on both the low- and highstakes tests, however, the results from the lower-stakes test appear primarily limited to students in the high-stakes grade. Finally, we find some evidence that the relative improvements following the introduction of the A Plan by low-performing schools were more due to the stigma of receiving the low grade rather than the threat of vouchers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

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Date posted: October 26, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Figlio, David N. and Rouse, Cecilia E., Do Accountability and Voucher Threats Improve Low-Performing Schools? (September 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11597. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=800452

Contact Information

David N. Figlio (Contact Author)
Northwestern University ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Cecilia E. Rouse
Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section ( email )
Princeton, NJ 08544-2098
United States
609-258-4042 (Phone)
609-258-2907 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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