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A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism
Nuno Garoupa University of Illinois College of Law Jonathan Klick Erasmus School of Law; University of Pennsylvania Law School Francesco Parisi University of Minnesota - Law School Public Choice, Vol. 128, pp. 147-168, 2006 George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-29 FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 05-25 FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 174 Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-27 Abstract: This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. Challenging the conventional application of the basic rational agent model of crime in the context of terrorism, it considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities.
Keywords: organized crime, basic crime model, communal liability, deterrence, incapacitation, penalty enhancements, terrorism JEL Classifications: K14, K42 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: September 09, 2005 ; Last revised: May 10, 2007Suggested CitationContact Information
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