Justice and the Administrative State: The FDIC and the Superior Bank Failure (Essay)
Christian A. Johnson
University of Utah College of Law
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Vol. 36, p. 483, 2005
This essay demonstrates through the Superior Bank failure how an administrative agency, the FDIC, can act without taking into account what is fair and just for all involved parties, instead maximizing its power or its economic recovery. The author argues that the FDIC lost sight of how it should have responded and not how it could have by giving preferential treatment to Superior's shareholders and attempting to sue the auditor Ernst & Young in contravention of Superior's contractual obligations. The FDIC's actions sublimated the fairness of the insolvency resolution process for the creditors of Superior and exposed Ernst & Young to liabilities well beyond what it had contracted for with Superior.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 12
Keywords: Economic regulation, bank failure, Superior, Pritzker, receiver, conservator, FDIC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, administrative agency, justice, fairness
JEL Classification: G28, G21, K23Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 12, 2005
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