Justice and the Administrative State: The FDIC and the Superior Bank Failure (Essay)

Abstract:     
This essay demonstrates through the Superior Bank failure how an administrative agency, the FDIC, can act without taking into account what is fair and just for all involved parties, instead maximizing its power or its economic recovery. The author argues that the FDIC lost sight of how it should have responded and not how it could have by giving preferential treatment to Superior's shareholders and attempting to sue the auditor Ernst & Young in contravention of Superior's contractual obligations. The FDIC's actions sublimated the fairness of the insolvency resolution process for the creditors of Superior and exposed Ernst & Young to liabilities well beyond what it had contracted for with Superior.

Keywords: Economic regulation, bank failure, Superior, Pritzker, receiver, conservator, FDIC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, administrative agency, justice, fairness

JEL Classifications: G28, G21, K23

Accepted Paper Series