SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

References (58)

Beta

 
 

Citations (42)

Beta

 


 



Do Managers Withhold Bad News?

S.P. Kothari
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Susan Shu
Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Peter D. Wysocki
University of Miami School of Business Administration



Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming
MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4556-05

Abstract:     
In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average, delays the release of bad news to investors.

Keywords: Bad News, Conservatism, Disclosure

JEL Classifications: G14, G30, K22, M41, M45, D82, M40

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: September 21, 2005 ; Last revised: January 30, 2009

Suggested Citation

Kothari, S.P., Shu, Susan and Wysocki, Peter D., Do Managers Withhold Bad News?. Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming; MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4556-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=803865


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

S.P. Kothari (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
E52-325
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0994 (Phone)
617-253-0603 (Fax)
Susan Shu
Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )
Boston College
140 Commonwealth Ave.
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167
United States
617-552-1759 (Phone)
Peter D. Wysocki
University of Miami School of Business Administration ( email )
Department of Accounting - K/E 308
5250 University Drive
Coral Gables, FL 33146-6531
United States
305-284-8618 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,430
Downloads: 1,492
Download Rank: 2,600
References: 58
Citations: 42

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apollo1 in 0.156 seconds.