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The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms

David S. Evans
University College London; University of Chicago Law School

Richard Schmalensee
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


September 2005

NBER Working Paper No. W11603

Abstract:     
Two-sided platforms (2SPs) cater to two or more distinct groups of customers, facilitating value-creating interactions between them. The village market and the village matchmaker were 2SPs; eBay and Match.com are more recent examples. Other examples include payment card systems, magazines, shopping malls, and personal computer operating systems. Building on the seminal work of Rochet and Tirole (2003), a rapidly growing literature has illuminated the economic principles that apply to 2SPs generally. One key result is that 2SPs may find it profit-maximizing to charge prices for one customer group that are below marginal cost or even negative, and such skewed pricing pattern is prevalent, although not universal, in industries that appear to be based on 2SPs. Over the years, courts have also recognized that certain industries, notably payment card systems and newspapers, now understood to be based on 2SPs, are governed by unusual economic relationships. This chapter provides an introduction to the economics of 2SPs and its application to several competition policy issues.

JEL Classifications: D4, L1, L4

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 27, 2005 ; Last revised: October 27, 2005

Suggested Citation

Schmalensee, Richard and Evans, David S., The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms (September 2005). NBER Working Paper No. W11603. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=804249


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Contact Information

Richard Schmalensee (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Room E52-410
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-2957 (Phone)
617-258-6617 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
David S. Evans
University College London ( email )
London WC1E OEG United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/current/graduate/courses/competition-regulation/economics/index.shtml
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
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