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The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms


David A. Evans


U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) - National Center for Environmental Economics

Richard Schmalensee


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David S. Evans


University of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group

September 2005

NBER Working Paper No. w11603

Abstract:     
Two-sided platforms (2SPs) cater to two or more distinct groups of customers, facilitating value-creating interactions between them. The village market and the village matchmaker were 2SPs; eBay and Match.com are more recent examples. Other examples include payment card systems, magazines, shopping malls, and personal computer operating systems. Building on the seminal work of Rochet and Tirole (2003), a rapidly growing literature has illuminated the economic principles that apply to 2SPs generally. One key result is that 2SPs may find it profit-maximizing to charge prices for one customer group that are below marginal cost or even negative, and such skewed pricing pattern is prevalent, although not universal, in industries that appear to be based on 2SPs. Over the years, courts have also recognized that certain industries, notably payment card systems and newspapers, now understood to be based on 2SPs, are governed by unusual economic relationships. This chapter provides an introduction to the economics of 2SPs and its application to several competition policy issues.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

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Date posted: October 27, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Evans, David A., Schmalensee, Richard and Evans, David S., The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms (September 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11603. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=804249

Contact Information

David A. Evans (Contact Author)
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) - National Center for Environmental Economics ( email )
Washington, DC 20460
United States
Richard Schmalensee (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Room E52-410
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-2957 (Phone)
617-258-6617 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
David S. Evans
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
University College London ( email )
London WC1E OEG
United Kingdom
Global Economics Group ( email )
1400 S. Dearborn, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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