First do no Harm: The Problem of Spyware
Susan P. Crawford
Harvard University - Berkman Center for Internet & Society
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 20, p. 1433, 2005
Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 134
Over the last few years, there has been enormous U.S. interest in legislating rules governing spyware. This Article provides a comprehensive overview of the bills that have been proposed (and passed) in the states and on the federal level. It argues that because spyware is impossible to define, these legislative efforts may do harm to the extent they either are focused on design mandates or are attempts to require notice for electronic interactions. Only a technical approach - and only a particular kind of technical approach at that - will work in addressing spyware. Technical actors need to take an immune system approach to spyware, dividing their efforts and experimenting in the field the same way immunity networks do. If we think of the legal system as a medical expert operating on this difficult disease, our first priority must be to wait to allow these already-emerging immunity networks to take effect, and to do no harm in the interim. This is a time for patience, not for the knife.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44
Keywords: spyware, cyberlawAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 20, 2005
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