Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=805426
 
 

Footnotes (155)



 


 



The Political Economy of Up-Front Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense


Ronald F. Wright


Wake Forest University - School of Law

Wayne A. Logan


Florida State University - College of Law


William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 47, 2006
FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 237
Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 05-19
William Mitchell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 27

Abstract:     
In this article, we trace the origin and spread of state laws designed to make indigent criminal defendants pay, up-front, a portion of the costs of their state-appointed counsel. These co-pays, which can range from $10 to over $200, are part of the increasingly popular pay-as-you-go movement, requiring criminal defendants to defray the system costs of their prosecution and punishment.

On their face, such laws would appear to be a natural target of vigorous resistance by the defense bar. This turns out to be only half true, however, for it is often the leaders of public defense organizations, faced with severe budget cuts, who take the lead in advocating for the laws. The leadership encounters resistance from its front-line staff attorneys, who uncompromisingly invoke principles of government responsibility to the poor, and assert that fees will chill defendants' willingness to request a lawyer. Judges also react grudgingly to these laws, either by implementing them slowly or by invalidating them outright.

This political dynamic reveals a remarkable gap in criminal justice knowledge: the actual number of defendants who waive their legal right to counsel. Both supporters and detractors of the up-front fees make unsupported assumptions about the amount of waiver. We analyze data from two jurisdictions with co-pay laws, Minnesota and North Carolina, and find no sign of increased waiver directly caused by the laws. We then discuss the limitations of the data, and reflect on why public officials do not put more effort into tracking choices of defendants (especially misdemeanor defendants) that have such large effects on the cost and quality of the justice system.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Criminal Procedure, Defense Counsel, Crime Politics, Waiver of Counsel

JEL Classification: K41, K42

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: September 20, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Wright, Ronald F. and Logan, Wayne A., The Political Economy of Up-Front Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense. William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 47, 2006; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 237; Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 05-19; William Mitchell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 27. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=805426

Contact Information

Ronald F. Wright (Contact Author)
Wake Forest University - School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States
336-758-5727 (Phone)
336-758-4496 (Fax)

Wayne A. Logan
Florida State University - College of Law ( email )
425 W. Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32306
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,789
Downloads: 204
Download Rank: 87,507
Footnotes:  155

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.344 seconds