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The Stability Pact Pains: A Forward-Looking Assessment of the Reform Debate


Marco Buti


European Commission, DG II

Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger


Tilburg University (CentER) - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Daniele Franco


Bank of Italy

August 2005

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-101

Abstract:     
The Stability and Growth Pact has been under fire ever since it was born. But is the Pact a flawed fiscal rule? Against established criteria for an ideal fiscal rule, its design and compliance mechanisms show strengths and weaknesses. The latter tend to reflect tradeoffs typical of supra-national arrangements. In the end, only a higher degree of fiscal integration would remove the inflexibility inherent in the recourse to predefined budgetary rules. No alternative solution put forward in the literature appears clearly superior. This does not mean that the original Pact of 1997 could not be improved. The debate on the SGP has shown that any reform should aim at overcoming the excessive uniformity of the rules, improving their transparency, correcting pro-cyclicality and strengthening enforcement. The reform of the Pact agreed in 2005 moves in this direction but leaves open a number of issues.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: EMS, fiscal policy, fiscal rules, Economic and Monetary Union, Stability and Growth Pact

JEL Classification: E61, H3, H6, H7

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Date posted: October 2, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Buti, Marco, Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. and Franco, Daniele, The Stability Pact Pains: A Forward-Looking Assessment of the Reform Debate (August 2005). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-101. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=810264 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.810264

Contact Information

Marco Buti (Contact Author)
European Commission, DG II ( email )
Rue de la Loi 200
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium
+32 2 296 2246 (Phone)
+32 2 299 3505 (Fax)
Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Tilburg University (CentER) - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2411 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Daniele Franco
Bank of Italy ( email )
Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy
+39 06 4792 2793 (Phone)
+39 06 4792 2324 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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