Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=814749
 
 

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Limiting Limited Liability


Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci


University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute


Economics Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-7, 2006
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-32
Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2005-05

Abstract:     
Limited liability may result in inefficient accident prevention, because a relevant portion of the expected harm is externalized on victims. This paper shows that under some restrictive conditions further limiting liability by means of a liability cap can improve caretaking.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: insolvency, judgment proof, liability, bankruptcy, liability cap

JEL Classification: K13, K32, L59

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: September 29, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Limiting Limited Liability. Economics Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-7, 2006; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-32; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2005-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=814749

Contact Information

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE) ( email )
Roeterstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://darimattiacci.acle.nl
Tinbergen Institute
Roetersstraat 31
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AuUfjxUAAAAJ&hl=en
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