Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=816006
 
 

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Oracle v. PeopleSoft: A Case Study


David Millstone


Independent

Guhan Subramanian


Harvard Business School


Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This case describes Oracle's hostile takeover bid to acquire PeopleSoft, which began with an unsolicited cash tender offer at $16.00 per share in June 2003 and ended with a negotiated deal at $26.50 per share in December 2004. Novel questions of corporate law are raised by the prolonged use of a poison pill against a structurally non-coercive, all-cash, fully-financed offer; as well as PeopleSoft's unprecedented Customer Assurance Program (CAP), which promised PeopleSoft customers between two and five times their money back if Oracle acquired PeopleSoft and then reduced support for PeopleSoft products. This case study will be published as part of a dealmaking symposium in the Harvard Negotiation Law Review, followed by commentaries from practitioners involved in the deal, judges, and academics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Takeovers, Oracle, PeopleSoft, poison pill, takeover defense

JEL Classification: G34, K22, L40, L86

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: October 12, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Millstone, David and Subramanian, Guhan, Oracle v. PeopleSoft: A Case Study. Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=816006

Contact Information

David Millstone
Independent ( email )
No Address Available
Guhan Subramanian (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-9784 (Phone)
617-496-7379 (Fax)
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