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Puzzling Tax Structures in Developing Countries: A Comparison of Two Alternative Explanations


Roger H. Gordon


University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics; Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Wei Li


University of Virginia - Darden School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

October 2005

NBER Working Paper No. w11661

Abstract:     
Observed economic policies in developing countries differ sharply both from those observed among developed countries and from those forecast by existing models of optimal policies. For example, developing countries rely little on broad-based taxes, and make substantial use of tariffs and seignorage as nontax sources of revenue.The objective of this paper is to contrast the implications of two models designed to explain such anomalous policies. One approach, by Gordon-Li (2005), focuses on the greater difficulties faced in poor countries in monitoring taxable activity, and explores the best available policies given such difficulties. The other, building on Grossman-Helpman (1994), presumes that political-economy problems in developing countries are worse, leading to worse policy choices. The paper compares the contrasting theoretical implications of the two models with the data, and finds that the political-economy approach does poorly in reconciling many aspects of the data with the theory. In contrast, the forecasts from Gordon-Li model are largely consistent with the data currently available.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

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Date posted: December 7, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Roger H. and Li, Wei, Puzzling Tax Structures in Developing Countries: A Comparison of Two Alternative Explanations (October 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11661. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=819822

Contact Information

Roger H. Gordon (Contact Author)
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
United States
858-534-4828 (Phone)
858-534-7040 (Fax)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Wei Li
University of Virginia (UVA) - Darden School of Business ( email )
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
804-243-7691 (Phone)
804-243-7681 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.darden.virginia.edu/faculty/li.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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