Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=821087
 
 

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Regulatory Co-opetition: Transcending the Regulatory Competition Debate


Damien Geradin


George Mason University School of Law; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Covington & Burling LLP

Joseph A. McCahery


Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Duisenberg School of Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

2005

Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2005-06

Abstract:     
In this paper, we critically examine the theory of regulatory competition. The departure point of this theory is that governments compete for factors of production - and also to attract habitants - when they regulate. Thus, regulation should satisfy citizen preferences if competition is effective. In general, it is argued that decentralized regulation produces more efficient results, because at the level of local government competition is greater. We discuss the main lines of this theoretical perspective and point to their normative implications. We then criticize the oversimplification of the theory and suggest an alternative approach, namely 'regulatory co-opetition'. This approach considers three main dimensions of competition and cooperation, including 'extra-governmental', in which nongovernmental actors also play a role. We argue that this multi-dimensional approach clarifies the complexity of actual regulatory strategies, in which different combinations of competition and cooperation are present in relationships between different actors involved in the regulatory arena. Each dimension influences the regulatory behavior of actors, creating pressures and opportunities.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Regulatory competition, regulatory co-opetition, decentralization, nongovernmental actors

JEL Classification: H11, K20

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Date posted: October 19, 2005  

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien and McCahery, Joseph A., Regulatory Co-opetition: Transcending the Regulatory Competition Debate (2005). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2005-06. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=821087 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.821087

Contact Information

Damien Geradin
George Mason University School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

George Mason Law School Logo

Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/
Covington & Burling LLP ( email )
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-2401
United States
Joseph A. McCahery (Contact Author)
Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31-(0)13-466-2306 (Phone)
+31-(0)13-466-2323 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Duisenberg School of Finance ( email )
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
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