Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=82669
 
 

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Comparative Politics and Public Finance


Torsten Persson


Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gérard Roland


University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Guido Tabellini


University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo); Bocconi University - Department of Economics

September 1997

IGIER Working Paper No. 114

Abstract:     
We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

JEL Classification: A10, H00, D72, D78

working papers series


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Date posted: February 1, 1997  

Suggested Citation

Persson, Torsten and Roland, Gérard and Tabellini, Guido, Comparative Politics and Public Finance (September 1997). IGIER Working Paper No. 114. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=82669 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.82669

Contact Information

Torsten Persson (Contact Author)
Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) ( email )
Stockholm University
10691 Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden
+46 8 163066 (Phone)
+46 8 164177 (Fax)
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Gérard Roland
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
510-642-4321 (Phone)
510-642-6615 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Guido Tabellini
University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy
+39 02 5836 3305 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 3302 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research (CESifo)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy
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